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The current view of economic development is just that an economy 
grows if and only if it is endowed with those features that dispose 
economic actors to engage in market exchange, not least by 
protecting their interests when they do.  In Max Weber’s formulation 
of one of the earliest versions of this thesis the emphasis was 
famously on dispositions to entrepreneurialism thought to derive from 
uncertainties of personal salvation said to derive from certain 
Protestant theologies.  The currently dominant institutional variant of 
the endowment notion shifts the emphasis from spiritual or 
psychological motivation to the general conditions facilitating market 
exchange, especially the presence of legal rules that help induce 
investment by protecting property rights broadly understood, and the 
availability of courts and regulatory bodies capable of adjusting the 
rules to serve this end when circumstances demand.  But such 
differences aside this family of views shares the assumption that the 
features that favor or obstruct development are part of a society’s 
fundamental constitution—its definitive endowments—and as such all 
but inaccessible to deliberate revision.  Thus a society that has not 
spontaneously generated the growth-promoting endowments, or 
                                                 
1 This paper has benefited greatly from continuing discussion with Robert Unger.  It has been scooped by 
Dani Rodrik, to whose work is it is plainly and deeply indebted.  He began to see the implications of his 
research for a new, processual type of industrial policy in just the months that I began to realize the 
possibility of interpreting his findings as an economy- wide variant of the Toyota-inspired organizational 
changes I have been investigating in public and private institutions.  His “Industrial Policy of the 21st 
Century” is a more compelling and authoritative statement of the emergent view than the first synthesis 
here. 
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acquired them as a historical legacy (for instance, through 
colonization by a society that is so endowed) is likely to come into 
possession of them only when continuing stagnation renders it unable 
to resist the conforming pressures of more successful competitors.  
 
The official interpretation of this view—promulgated as the 
“Washington consensus” by the IMF and the World Bank—is that the 
only institutions favoring growth are those that directly prohibit market 
distortion or obstruct political manipulations with distortionary effects:  
import duties and export subsidies are to be eliminated (liberalization); 
state-owned firms, managed for the benefit of electoral clienteles and 
their elite patrons, sold off (privatization); public spending, with its 
continuing temptation to populist excess, reduced and redirected to 
debt service (stabilization).  Courts and other rule interpreting and 
enforcing entities—together, the rule of law—are added, in the 
current, “second-generation” version of the Consensus, as 
indispensable market-making institutions, for without them, recent 
experience teaches, the prohibitions on and precautions against 
distortion have no effect.   
 
Until recently the sharpest criticism of this consensus view was the 
heterodox interpretation of serviceable—growth-promoting—
institutional endowments associated with the early work of Rodrik and 
his collaborators. While the heterodox view also assumes that 
participation in the world economy—openness—is indeed 
indispensable to growth, it finds that the most effective means for a 
particular economy to enter world competition depend on 
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idiosyncrasies of its context, and may well involve (temporary) 
institutional innovations disallowed by the Consensus. Thus, from the 
heterodox perspective, incentives to export (expeditious regulation for 
firms locating in export processing exclaves, provision of sector-
specific research and physical infrastructure) can be judiciously 
combined with protection of the non-traded sector (tariffs and 
minimum wages laws) and with controls on capital flows to maximize 
the chances of effective opening while minimizing the chances of a 
sweeping domestic disruption through a flood of imports or an 
international financial shock.   
 
More recently still the succession of failures of Consensus-based 
reform programs in countries as different as Russia, Bolivia, and East 
Germany, successful heterodox openings in China, India, Mauritius 
and Botswana (the last two being the post-War African success 
stories)2, and detailed empirical results produced to evaluate the 
orthodox institutional view are moving proponents of the heterodox 
view to  transform what began as an intra-mural challenge to the 
endowments school into an alternative to it.  Where the Consensus 
view sees market-favoring institutions as a all-or-nothing proposition, 
with still-to-develop economies typically endowed with nothing, the 
emergent process or bootstrapping view of growth sees developing 
economies as often, perhaps nearly always, disposing of many of the 
institutions and capacities needed for growth. At any moment what 
obstructs growth in a particular, currently stagnating economy, on this 
view, is some combination of two kinds of constraints.  The first kind 
                                                 
2 Dani Rodrik, ed., In Search of Prosperity, 2003 
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are the direct obstacles to market exchange (though these tend to be 
less frequent and daunting than the Consensus holds).  The second 
and often more important type of constraint is the absence of certain 
public goods: support institutions that help potential exporters 
determine where they should direct their efforts, and then provide the 
training, quality certification, physical infrastructure, and various 
stages of venture capital that new entrants to the export sector are 
unlikely to be able to provide themselves. Removal of the most 
pressing bundle of constraints, the argument continues, raises growth 
rates by several percentage points a year.  Continued growth, and 
the gradual transformation of an economy into a reliably growing 
“tiger,” depends on relaxing successive (and successively different) 
bundles. 
 
The focus on relaxing successive constraints corresponds to a re-
interpretation of the kinds of institutions that favor growth; and this re-
interpretation in turn undermines the claim that growth depends on 
institutional endowments in the familiar sense of a single, well defined 
set of mutually supportive institutions.  As a reform program, the goal 
of the Consensus view is to create institutions that shape economic 
activity—directing it towards market transactions—yet are not shaped 
by it, except as may be required by (and limited through) the rule of 
law.  Behind this idea of institutions as a kind of deus absconditus lies 
the economist’s inveterate fear, dating to Adam Smith and 
periodically refueled by failures of traditional government industrial 
policies for accelerating development, that the very possibility of 
changing the rules of the economic game provokes a power struggle 
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among economic actors determined to advance their interests by 
political manipulation rather than competition in the market place.  
 
The process or bootstrapping view, in contrast, assumes that even in 
the absence of market distortions, growth requires continuing social 
learning. The goal therefore is to create institutions that can learn to 
identify and mitigate different, successive constraints on growth, 
including of course such constraints as arise from defects in the 
current organization of the learning institutions themselves.  Insofar 
as these institutional interventions go beyond rescission of the 
market-obstructing rules and aim to shape entrepreneurial behavior 
(if only by helping potential entrepreneurs clarify what their choices 
might be) they resemble the traditional industrial policies—the state 
picking winners—which the Consensus vehemently rejects.  But that 
is as far as the similarity between industrial policy in the traditional 
sense and the process view goes. Traditional industrial policy 
assumes that the state has a panoramic view of the economy, 
enabling it reliably to provide incentives, information and services that 
less knowledgeable private actors cannot. There are no actors in the 
process or bootstrapping view with this kind of overarching vision. All 
vantage points are partial. So just as private actors typically need 
public help in overcoming information limits and coordination 
problems, the public actors who provide that help themselves 
routinely need assistance from other actors, private and public, in 
overcoming limitations of their own.  Instead of trying to build inviolate 
public institutions whose perfection guarantees, once and for all, an 
equally inviolate, but wholly private, market order, the process view 
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aims for corrigibility: institutions which, acknowledging the vanity of 
perfectibility the from the beginning on can be rebuilt, again and again, 
by changing combinations of public and private actors, in light of the 
changing social constraints on market activity that their activity helps 
bring to notice. 
 
If growth-favoring institutions are indeed built by a bootstrapping 
process where each move suggests the next, then such institutions 
are as much the outcome as the starting point of development.  They 
cannot, in other words, be as the endowments view portrays them: a 
foundation upon which a market order must be built if it is to stand at 
all.   
 
The only exception is when the rules, institutions and distribution of 
political power in a particular economy all interlock in ways that make 
it impossible to identify and mitigate current constraints. When there 
are such infernal traps—market failures aggravating and aggravated 
by government failures aggravating and aggravated by political 
failures and failures of civil society—bootstrapping is stopped before 
it gets off to a (potentially self-re-enforcing) start.  This can be the 
case, for example, when political elites seize control of oil or other 
natural resources and prefer to live by predation and terror rather 
than allowing domestic development to create alternative centers of 
power. If such lock ins are common, then the process view is just 
wrong as a general characterization of the circumstances of 
economic development; and the Consensus emphasis on uprooting 
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market-obstructing institutions (even perhaps some of its disdain for 
heterodox solutions) is at least understandable.   
 
Subject to this limitation the process view’s program of institutional 
investigation and reform differs sharply from that of the endowment 
school. Where the latter tries to offer reformers a more and more 
precise idea of the background institutions—the common law, specific 
rules protecting minority shareholders—that do the real work of 
making markets, the former challenges itself and urges reformers to 
provide a deeper and more general view of how to organize social 
learning, especially as it bears on detecting and correcting constraints 
on development. 
 
This essay aims to contribute to the emerging process agenda by 
reviewing the new stylized facts of development that point to it and 
specifying the key organizational features of, and open questions 
regarding the corrigible, learning institutions at its core. Part 2  
marshals the growing body of evidence weighing against the 
endowment view and for the bootstrapping alternative.  Part 3 
presents the Toyoda production system as the model of the type of 
institution with precisely the constraint identifying and mitigating 
capacities taken to be necessary for development in the process view.  
The argument is that such organizations, increasingly central to  the 
private and public sectors of the advanced democracies, and even to 
regulatory regimes nationally and globally,  are coming to shape 
development policy. Assuming that such shaping influence will 
continue Part 4 explores the governance mechanisms by which an 
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industrial policy based on Toyoda production-system principles can 
learn from, collaborate with and ultimately help transform the context 
of the economic actors without being captured by them. 
 
Though the tone here is matter of fact, and the matters presented are 
as factual as such things tend to be, this is an exploratory essay.  I 
am reasonably confident of the process view of development, and 
that any measures that can systematically guide the process will have 
to be informed by Toyoda-style principles. But in underscoring this 
theoretical possibility, and introducing some empirical hints of its 
feasibility, I mean to provide clues to guide the search for a 
development policy suited to our times, not suggest that the search 
has already succeeded.     
 
2.  The New Stylized Facts of Economic Development 
 
The Consensus view holds, we saw, that stagnating economies are 
enduringly and pervasively corrupted. That is why growth can not 
begin without external intervention to remove the institutional, cultural 
or political sources of the corruption.  But there is compelling 
evidence that, with the exception of infernally trapped countries, less 
developed economies are on many dimensions internally 
differentiated and rapidly changing—too heterogeneous and mutable 
to be any one thing—to have an essence—at all, let alone to be 
essentially and enduringly corrupted. There is strong evidence, 
furthermore, that the institutions of developing economies are highly 
differentiated as well. Far from forming indissoluble wholes, they exist 
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as connected but often detachable pieces, some performing well, or 
easily reformable, others badly broken and hard to repair.  Because 
at least some parts of a developing economy are likely to be (on the 
verge of) doing well much of the time, and some of its surrounding 
institutions are likely to be serviceable, the problem of development is 
not starting growth, but using the functioning institutions to relax 
obstacles to the growth likely to be under way. In the most dramatic 
cases—of which China is the best current example—the outcome of 
this piecemeal reform is a thoroughgoing transformation of the 
economy and the institutions of development.  But even when the 
outcome is far less transformative, the new facts of economic 
growth—heterogeneity of economic performance and institutions--
suggest a new way of thinking of economic development, and 
corresponding strategies for encouraging it.  
 
To begin with, the growth rates of individual less developed 
economies vary widely and abruptly, so that it is often misleading to 
classify such economies as either stagnant or growing: they are both 
in turn. More exactly, as Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik have 
recently shown, spells of accelerated development often occur 
spontaneously, or with only marginal reforms.  Counting 
conservatively,3 they identified more than 80 episodes since1950 
in which a country’s growth rate increased by at least 2 percentage 
points for at least seven years—the “vast majority” of these occurring 
the absence of consensus-driven liberalization or opening. To the 
                                                 
3 Excluding, that is, very small countries, those with less than two decades of data, rebounds from 
crises, and accelerations that peaked at annual growth rates of less than 3.5 percent.  
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extent that acceleration was connected to reform, the latter was 
hesitant and often literally marginal: the introduction of market prices 
at the margins of Chinese agriculture in the late 1970s; an increase in 
interest rates and a currency devaluation that helped close the gap 
between the private and social returns on investment in South Korea 
in the early 1960s, and so on. (Hausmann et al., 2004; Rodrik and 
Subramanian 2004).  A first and fundamental new stylized fact of 
development, then, is that economic growth, while not ubiquitous and 
self perpetuating, is not hard to start—and thus not as dependent on 
the “right” macroeconomic or institutional setting as the endowment 
view makes them out to be.  
 
Just as the performance of less developed economies is 
heterogeneous over time, so is it heterogeneous geographically, with 
some areas growing with occasional interruptions while others 
stagnate. It is a familiar fact that large developing countries such as 
Brazil, India and China contain highly developed, ‘first-world” 
provinces (Saõ Paolo in Brazil, Bangalore in India) along with 
backward ones.  Because development is uneven in space as well as 
time, and occurs more frequently in general, and more nearly 
consistently in some place places than normally supposed,  there is a 
highly likelihood that at least some parts of most developing societies 
will be growing, or on the verge of growth, much of the time. If 
national institutions, or endowments generally, had the preponderant 
effect attributed to them in the standard view such start regional 
disparities should be rare exceptions, not commonplace.    
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At higher degrees of resolution, moreover, the spatial differentiation 
of development becomes still more evident, and some of its 
underpinnings at least partly intelligible. Growth in less developed 
economies, as in advanced ones, often occurs in clusters: 
geographically compact agglomerations of firms, many small and 
medium sized, cooperating directly or otherwise drawing on common 
resources in one or several closely related areas of economic activity.  
By spontaneously recombining and augmenting fragmented 
specialized, and at least partly tacit knowledge—know-how 
embedded in a way of life—a cooperative multiplicity of clustered 
firms adapts rapidly to changes in the economic environment. As the 
gains from these externalities are, within broad limits, self re-
enforcing—the more firms with complementary specializations, the 
greater the advantage to each from the presence of the others—
spontaneous, accidental clustering will be self perpetuating. Insofar 
as it benefits from such network effects, economic activity will thus be 
by nature geographically lumpy.  Since the turbulent, continuing 
transformation of products and markets now called globalization 
began to put a premium on such robustness in the mid 1980s, 
clusters have been widely regarded as a model, microcosm, or key 
component of the “new” economy, able to prosper in much more 
volatile conditions than the traditional, hierarchically organized large 
corporation. A good deal of the recent, detailed literature describing 
such growth as is actually occurring in developing economies (as 
opposed to accounts of aggregate performance and its supposed 
determinants) focuses on successes and difficulties of clusters of this 
kind:  footwear in the Sinos Valley of Rio Grande do Sul and 
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aerospace in Saõ José dos Campos, in Brazil, wine growing in the 
province of Mendoza, in Argentina, or the Colchagu valley in Chile, 
computer components in Hinchu, Taiwan, garments in various 
locations in Vietnam, soccer balls in Sialkot, Pakistan, are prominent 
examples. That such clusters can prosper at all in countries (once) 
thought to be obstructive, if not inimical to development underscores 
that national institutions are less determinative than conventionally 
thought. Conversely, the frequently counter-intuitive distribution of 
clusters within in each country—the Mendoza wine industry has 
captured 2 percent of the $12 billion global market through continuing 
improvements in grape growing and wine making; the industry in the 
neighboring province of San Juan, with similar terroire and micro 
climates, has until recently scarcely advanced—suggests that subtle 
variations in sub-national institutions and arrangements count for 
more than the standard view allows. 
 
At still higher degrees of resolution it becomes clear that even within 
particular, geographically concentrated clusters there is great 
variability as well.  For one thing, extremely careful studies of rates of 
return among “like” firms reveals great variability, not the 
convergence that conventional theory would predict. (Banerjee) Part 
of this dispersion is likely to be due to the differences in the firms’ 
strategies and the capabilities which these suppose. Many of the 
cluster firms in less developed economies are performing routine 
operations according to detailed instructions from, and under the 
close supervision of multinational clients.  Competition is on cost, and 
more exactly low costs of labor. Informal capacities for local 
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adjustment are likely to be indispensable to survival, but occasions to 
develop the skills on which they rest are limited.  But it is also a 
common finding of current writing on these clusters that alongside 
such firms there exist more capable ones. These more capable 
industrial firms, farms, fisheries and forest producers have mastered 
various combinations of the just-in-time disciplines of quality control, 
continuous improvement and co-design—about which more below.   
In so doing they learn to complement and transform their tacit skills 
and  take on more and more demanding tasks within the global 
supply chains of multinational customers. Some gain access to final 
markets (first regional, then global) of their own.   
 
Pressure on developing economy suppliers to adapt the more 
advanced methods is by all accounts increasing, and the ability to do 
so will plainly have an important bearing on success in the global 
economy. At the limit, mastery of these co-production disciplines will 
be a precondition for any but the most subaltern participation in world 
markets. Just as plainly that ability varies from firm to firm, cluster to 
cluster and country to country in ways that have little direct 
connection to the general conditions thought to encourage 
international competitiveness on the standard view. For instance, El 
Salvador and Bangladesh rapidly expanded their garment industries 
to supply multinational customers with cheap, standard products such 
as t-shirts. But they find that this success does not automatically 
prepare small and medium sized firms  to respond to customers’ 
demands for specialization and rapid changeover from one fashion-
sensitive product to another, including the ability to correct the 
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customers’ design errors and suggest improvements and source 
fabric and trim locally to avoid long production delays without paying 
high inventory costs. Many electronics and metalworking clusters in 
Mexican maquiladoras or export zones are having trouble with an 
analogous transition, even though some of their constituent firms 
have been working with just-in-time methods for a decade or more. 
On the other hand, some clusters (such as Mendoza) have 
successfully pursued “upgrading” strategies, involving hundreds of 
firms and novel associations among them and between them and 
state service providers, to meet the more stringent requirements. 
Again the upshot is that developing economy institutions or 
endowments are more varied and, at least within some ranges of the 
variation, more permissive or less constraining than the standard 
view supposes. 
 
We come, unsurprisingly, to a convergent conclusion if we shift the 
focus from the variation of the developing economy performance in 
time and space to general features of developing economy 
institutions themselves.  On the standard view, we saw, these 
institutions are thought to have essences—being market sustaining or 
not—which, as it were, create their own context, determining, once 
and for all, the impact of any of their parts on the course of 
development. But on closer inspection these institutions prove to be 
as context-dependent as context-determining: their effects arise in 
interaction with other institutions, not independent of them. Moreover, 
the institutions of developing economies are not integral wholes, but 
rather heterogeneous assemblies: layered, composite or otherwise 
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decomposable into (re-combinable) pieces, at least some of which 
function well, or at least better enough relative to others to serve as 
the starting points of reform.  Comprehensive evidence of this 
heterogeneity is hard to come by:  Responding to the evidentiary 
burdens assumed by the standard view, investigations of institutional 
performance typically take the form of league tables, ranking the 
aggregate ability of all government institutions in each country to  
deliver the rule of law (by, for example, eliminating corruption) and 
meet deregulatory goals. Reports of state entities that perform well in 
particular functional domains or regions can be dismissed as 
anecdotal exceptions, if they are noted at all. Still, some of the cases 
of institutional variety and transformation as so substantial that they 
compel the kind of attention due when an exception may be 
swallowing a rule; other, more contained instances are linked to 
broader, underlying changes in ways that suggest that they, too, may 
have general significance.  
 
Take first the evidence of the contextuality of institutional operation.  
As we will see momentarily, this is hardly a new stylized fact of 
development.  But it has been forgotten or ignored so often, and 
rediscovered recently with such elegance and pertinence that for 
purposes of this discussion we may accord it novelty value. 
 
The contextuality of institutions—of endowments—generally was, it 
will be recalled, the major finding of investigation of Weber’s original 
assertion of a connection between certain, sectarian variants of the 
Protestant ethic and the emergence of capitalism. If Weber was right 
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to think that unlimited but calculating individual striving was the key to 
growth, and religious questing key to this motivation, then there must 
be in all growing, non-Protestant economies some theological 
mechanism with motivational effects equivalent to those produced by 
Calvinist doubts about personal salvation.  In Asia, to take the case 
that most directly influenced the debate relevant here, such 
analogues abounded.  Japan had Jodo and Zen Buddhists as well as 
the Hotoku and Shingaku movements; Java the Santri Muslims; India 
the Jains, Parsis and various business or merchant castes.2 David C. 
McClelland grouped all those  sects into a general category of 
“positive mysticisms,” which included Weber’s Protestant ethic. 3
 
But (as economic historian have found in the case of Puritanism in 
colonial America) the “positive mysticisms” or “achievement 
orientation” of Asian sects and social groups yielded capitalist 
                                                 
2 “The influence of Jodo Buddhism and the Hotoku and Shingaku movements in Japan was discussed by 
Robert N. Bellah in Tokugawa Religion, Glencoe, Ill.:  Free Press, 1957, Chapter 5.  The Zen case in Japan 
was discussed by David C. McClelland, op. cit., pp. 369-370 under the mistaken impression that the 
samurai in the Meiji Period were devotees of Zen Buddhism. The Santri Muslims of Java were treated by 
Clifford Geertz in The Religion of Java, Glencoe, Ill.:  Free Press, 1960 and more especially in terms of the 
present context in “Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in a Central Javanese Town:  Some 
Preliminary Considerations,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Volume IV, number 2, 1956.  
McClelland has discussed the Jains and the Parsis in op. cit., pp. 368-369 and Milton Singer has discussed 
several Indian examples in “Cultural Values in India’s Economic Development,” The Annals, Volume 305, 
May, 1956, pp. 81-91.  The latter article received further comment from John Goheen, M. N. Srinivas, D.G. 
Karve and Mr. Singer in “India’s Cultural Values and Economic Development:  A Discussion,” Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, Volume VII, Number 1, 1958, pp. 1-12.  Nakamura Hajime in a brief 
article entitled “The Vitality of Religion in Asia” which appeared in Cultural Freedom in Asia, Herbert 
Passin, Ed., Rutland Vt.:  Tuttle, 1956, pp. 53-66 argued for the positive influence of a number of Asian 
religious currents on economic development.  In his more comprehensive The Ways of Thinking of Eastern 
Peoples, Tokyo:  Unesco, 1956 (An inadequate and partial translation of Toyojin no Shii Hoho, Tokyo:  
Misuzu Shobo, 1949, 2 vols.)  Nakamura takes a position very close to that of Weber.  The types of 
argument put forward in the above very partial listing of work on this problem are quite various.  In 
particular Clifford Geertz was careful to point out that the Santri religious ethic seemed suited to a 
specifically pre-capitalist small trader mentality which Weber argued was very different from the spirit of 
capitalism.  This distinction could perhaps be usefully applied to many of the above cases of traditional 
merchant groups which seem to have some special religious orientation supporting their occupational 
motivations.” 
3 Op. cit., pp. 367-373, 391. 
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economic development only in the context of supporting institutions 
which did not arise directly from the their behavior, no matter how 
much religious conviction or social orientation might incline individual 
members of these groupings to enact capitalism in their own lives.  
Thus the Japanese samurai, prominent from the 16th century on, 
became paladins of capitalist enterprise only after the Meiji 
restoration freed them of their political obligations and removed legal 
barriers to their exercise of certain trades.  Chinese merchants had 
limited success within the structure of Imperial China but became 
redoubtable capitalists in Southeast Asia.  The Muslin Santri 
merchants of Java were becoming vigorous entrepreneurs in the 
early 20th century, but relapsed into a more traditional trader role as 
institutional conditions became less favorable during the great 
Depression. 
 
More recently, but just as this classic discussion would lead us to 
expect, careful investigation supports the view that the economic 
import of particular families of legal institutions that diffused at the 
time of the great waves of European colonization—common law or 
the civil code and its analogues—depends largely on the local context 
in which they operate, and not, the endowment school would have it, 
on intrinsic pro- or anti-growth features of the institutions themselves. 
In the light of elegant recent studies by Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson it seems that the hospitability of particular locations to 
European colonists shaped the colonists’ economic strategies and 
choice of institutions. The institutions thus established influenced 
subsequent development. Where, for instance, high mortality rates 
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from malaria or dense population by first peoples made a territory 
relatively inhospitable to colonists, the latter minimized settlement by 
pursuing extractive strategies based on plantations and mining, and 
selected institutions matched to the resulting concentration of 
property and power.  Where conditions for settlement were more 
favorable, the Europeans colonized in larger numbers, and replicated 
home-country institutions favoring dispersed property.  The outcome 
as reflected in the long-term growth rate of the developing economy 
is thus not the result of an initial endowment with favorable or 
unfavorable, “natural” or “unnatural” institutions, but rather the 
interaction between the original setting, the strategic choice of 
development model, and the fixation of that choice in particular 
institutional arrangements.4   
 
Similarly Berglof and Bolton, in a recent review of economic 
outcomes in the transition economies find that “the reason why 
some … were able to cross the Great Divide [separating self-
reinforcing prosperity from poverty traps, cfs] while others did not 
must be sought to a large extent outside their financial and legal 
systems.” Among the heterogeneous factors explaining success they 
list: prior relations with and proximity to Western markets, democratic 
traditions, candidacy for EU membership, and low levels of 
integration into the Soviet plan economy with its huge factory towns 
and complex, fragile supply chains. 5 Again a particular institution—
                                                 
4 Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2001). “The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development:  An Empirical Investigation.” American Economic Review 91: 1369-1401 
5 Berglof and Bolton, 2002, p 94-74, citation from p. 94. 
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for instance, the common law—does not by itself decide outcomes 
any more than the Protestant ethic or any of its spiritual affines does. 
 
Even this contextualization of the endowments view does not go far 
enough.  For growth in different periods requires social mastery of 
new technologies and organizational forms; and the collective 
learning this supposes is unlikely to be an automatic by-product of the 
institutions that facilitate accumulation. In other words, whether 
market-making institutions actually produce growth in any particular 
epoch depends on the context of other learning-related institutions in 
which they operate. A recent survey of growth theory that makes of 
institutions a key but ill-understood variable, Helpman puts the point 
this way: 
 
Major technological developments have taken place in 
countries that protected private property from 
infringement by individuals and the state. A legal system 
that facilitates transactions and a political system that 
constrains the executive are needed for this purpose. But 
these institutions are not sufficient for growth. The reason 
is that major changes in technology always induce major 
changes in economic organizations. The centralized 
factory in the late eighteenth century, the large business 
corporation in the late nineteenth century, the process of 
vertical integration at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, and the recent trend toward greater 
fragmentation of production exemplify organizational 
responses to technological change. As a result, the ability 
of a country to grow also depends on its ability to 
accommodate such changes, and the ability to 
accommodate change depends in turn on a country’s 
economic and political institutions. (Helpman, p. 140)  
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And these latter institutions, Helpman concludes, are still so poorly 
understood as to count as the “mystery” of economic growth. 
 
Beyond even this contextualization of the endowment view lies the 
limit case of its polar opposite, where the institutions of growth are 
created through growing.  This brings us to China, which has 
manifestly grown institutions in just this way. The cascade of 
institutional changes begins with in the 1970s with an agricultural 
reform recognizing the peasants’ control over the plots they are 
currently working, and permitting them to sell, at market prices and 
for their own account, surplus above target levels.  The result is a 
sustained increase in agricultural productivity and a rise in rural 
incomes.  In the 1980s another wave of reform allows for the 
investment of the proceeds of agricultural improvement in Town and 
Village Enterprises (TVEs):  manufacturing firms, owned by 
municipalities or co-owned by them and private parties, and 
producing for both domestic and export markets. Again proceeds in 
excess of tax obligations to higher authorities are retained by the 
enterprise and available to its stakeholders.  The TVE’s continue to 
expand through the mid 1990s, competing with state-owned firms and 
adding to the modest pressure for their reform exerted by the central 
state. The changes are accompanied and accelerated by partial 
reforms of the financial system and the opening of export-processing 
enclaves to foreign firms and joint ventures. The upshot is a profusion 
of new institutions that create incentives for investment and 
efficiency-enhancing behavior in domain after domain without ever 
creating what, on the consensus, view, seem to be the essentials of a 
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capitalist economy: China is very haltingly privatizing state firms, only 
recently recognized private corporate property as a distinct legal 
category, and makes little pretense of an independent judiciary. 
 
An incomparably smaller, but still arguably revealing instance of 
piecemeal institutional change concerns reform of the institutions 
responsible for assuring hygiene and food safety of the Nile perch 
fishery on Kenya’s portion of Lake Victoria.  Exports of the fish, 
predominantly to the European Union, increased from under barely 
$100,000 in 1985 to just under $44 million in 1996 (perch 35).  
Starting in that year, however, the EU and various member states 
began to restrict perch imports from Kenya because of concerns 
about pathogens and pesticide residues, and, more generally, 
concerns that Kenyan producers could not assure  food safety and 
hygiene by meeting EU regulations based on Hazard Analysis of 
Critical Control Points (HACCPs). Under this form of regulation 
producers identify the production steps where pathogens are most 
likely to be introduced; devise remedial measures; test to verify that 
these measures produce outcomes within parameters fixed by the 
regulator for the relevant class of product; correct remaining shortfalls; 
and regularly verify, by routine tests, the effectiveness of the eventual 
methods. A competent public authority in turn periodically verifies the 
reliability of this self-monitoring.  
 
An EU technical assistance mission inspected the fishery with 
Kenyan counterparts and documented problems ranging from 
unhygienic storage of fish on the fishing vessels to spotty record 
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keeping, especially of “own checks” and inadequate vermin control at 
processing facilities,  to insufficient training of fisheries inspectors. 
(perch 42) to a wide variety of deficiencies in testing laboratory 
organization, maintenance, and equipment. In response, the Kenyan 
government concentrated oversight authority for the fisheries industry 
from three entities to one, and the fisheries producers formed 
themselves into a single association to treat with the government.  
The World Bank study on which this account draws noted substantial 
improvements not just in compliance with HACCP regulation, but also 
in the organization of many links in the supply chain and the public 
sector infrastructure (though the landings often fell short). Neither the 
foreign experts nor the domestic ones would alone have been able to 
identify the complex of problems and solutions.  The additional 
resources mustered to pay for the remedies might well have been 
wasted, and perhaps would not have been forthcoming at all in the 
absence of a report detailing the precise purposes to which they 
would be dedicated. During the period of these reforms Kenya ranked 
around 80 of 117 counties on the World Economic Forum’s 
competitiveness index:  a poor enough showing in the league tables 
of institutional adequacy to cast doubt on its ability to accomplish any 
reform, let alone to effect, in a short period, a coordinated series of 
demanding changes within the public sector and between it and 
private firms. Again, aggregate assessments obscure the internal 




Despite its marginal economic significance—in good years Nile perch 
accounts for only 2.5 percent of Kenyan exports—the regulatory 
reform of the fishery reflects broad trends in development. The 
introduction of HACCPs is of piece with the shift to just-in-time 
production noted above: the regulatory authorities in effect are 
requiring firms to demonstrate the same general capacities to detect 
and correct problems their customers require of them as well. 
Because they accord local actors great autonomy in determining how 
to meet general goals, rather than setting out universal and detailed 
rules for compliance, such regulatory systems are well suited to 
ensure product safety when—as now—product life-cycles are short, 
precise production arrangements vary greatly from place to place, 
and judgments regarding the acceptability of particular risks are 
frequently revised.  Partial reform, domain by domain, or, as in this 
case, one cluster at a time, also appears to be commonplace:  the 
accounts of cluster development referred to above almost invariably 
interweave discussion of restructuring of firms, and the relation 
among them, with re-organization in that particular cluster of the 
public infrastructure for verifying compliance with standards set both 
by public authorities and private buyers of the cluster’s products.  
Likewise the EU’s technical mission to Kenya to investigate problems 
and propose changes is part of broader pattern. Because developing 
country institutions are changed domain by domain and leading 
professionals in each domain are likely to participate from their 
student days on in international communities of interest, it is often 
opportune to create teams of local and foreign experts to address 
problems in context, and propose correspondingly specific solutions. 
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Thus the EU routinely insists that candidate members create 
committees to review key governance domains with qualified EU 
counterpart teams of their own choosing; and close observers of such 
collaboration, among them the World Bank, judge it to be one of the 
most reliably effective means of securing governance reform. From 
this vantage point the EU and Kenya were applying to the 
reorganization of the Nile perch fishery a tested method of piecemeal 
or place-by-place reform of the new, just-in-time type.   
 
A further and important tile in the mosaic of evidence suggesting the 
pervasiveness of step-by-step institutional reform (and the 
decomposability and adaptability of the ensemble of national 
institutions which diffusion of this type of reform supposes) is the 
frequency of heterodox adjustment. As noted at the outset, Rodrik, 
Hausmann and others have shown that successful openings of 
developing economies to the discipline of world markets tend to 
violate consensus expectation. Three, closely related kinds of 
deviation are especially salient.  
 
First, successful openings are generally partial in the straightforward 
sense that they are not comprehensive:  in the successful cases 
openness in (aspects of) some markets goes hand in hand with 
continued closure of non-exporting sectors of the economy, and of 
the financial system against external shocks. There is, conversely, 
little evidence that by themselves reduction of tariffs, non-tariff 
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barriers, and capital controls—the deregulatory reforms at the core of 
the traditional understanding of  free trade—raises growth rates.6  
 
Second, successful openings are deviantly partial in the sense that 
they tend to include what are, from the consensus perspective, 
impermissibly selective, and therefore inherently biased interventions 
in the economy. These interventions are typically in the form of  
public provision of infrastructure and other subsidies to exporters of 
just the kind the Kenyan government provided the Nile perch fishery, 
or, on a grander scale, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan provided 
sectors of their economies. Underscoring the pervasiveness of such 
selective interventions Rodrik finds in addition that, of the top five 
exports, excluding commodities, from Brazil, Chile and Mexico to the 
United States, all benefited from such public support, as well as 
export subsidies, preferential tariffs, and the like:  
 
In the case of Brazil, the steel, aircraft, and (to an 
important extent) shoe industries are all the creation 
of import substitution policies of the past. High levels of 
protection (steel and shoes) and public ownership, public 
R&D, and subsidized credit (aircraft) were deliberately 
used to generate rents for entrepreneurs investing in new 
areas and to build up industrial clusters. In the case of 
Chile, industrial policies played a huge role in grapes, 
forestry, and salmon. … In grapes, there was significant 
public R&D in the 1960s that transformed an industry that 
was primarily oriented to the local market into a global 
powerhouse …. And in forestry, there is a history of at 
least 60 years of subsidizing plantations … as well as a 
big push since 1974 to turn the wood, pulp and paper, 
                                                 
6 Rodrik, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness Work   
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and furniture cluster into a major export industry ...  In 
Mexico, the motor vehicles and computer industries are 
the creation of import-substitution policies 
(initially), followed by preferential tariff policies under 
NAFTA. None of these are the result of hands-off policies, 
or of level playing fields and unadulterated market 
forces.7
 
Third, successful openings tend to be deviant in pursuing indubitably 
important ends—assuring the security of investment—by what seem, 
from the consensus perspective, dubious or even impermissible 
institutional means. In China, we saw, some combination of  
bureaucratic tutelage or protection and a tiered system of tax targets 
with local retention of the surplus has substantially substituted for 
private property rights and courts as an instrument for encouraging 
investors. Taken together the tax and corporate law aligned the 
incentives of local and regional officials with those who invested in 
Town and Village Enterprises. Both prospered when the TVE did, and 
through the mid 1990s the bulk of investment in China was made in 
this form.  (Development in South Korea, Taiwan, and, more recently, 
Vietnam has arguably followed an analogous, if less conspicuously 
unconventional course, though I will not make the case for this view 
here.)  
 
But this outcome is, at best, counter-intuitive from the consensus or 
common-law view of institutions, according to which the key role of 
property law and courts is precisely to protect investors against 
bureaucrats.   More vexing still to the consensus position, just as the 
                                                 
7 Rodrik, Industrial Policy for the 21st Century (2004), p.   
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classic measures of free trade do not, by themselves, increase 
growth, so mass privatizations and the introduction of sophisticated 
corporate law enforced by a nominally independent judiciary have 
produced mediocre results in Russia and many other transition 
economies which derived policy from the assumption of clear rights to 
private property as the foundation of growth.  
 
Of course the partiality, selectivity and institutional unconventionality 
of heterodox reforms is only deviant from the standpoint of the 
consensus assumption that the institutions of growth are by nature 
self-contained totalities with the special property of facilitating trade 
by restraining all interference with it, including interference resulting 
from the institutional restraints themselves.  Indeed from this 
perspective reform that leaves anything essential unchanged, or tries 
to vary interventions to take account of the particularities of the 
economic and institutional situation, raises the suspicion of being 
more of the usual self-interested meddling, or simply no reform at all.  
If heterodox reforms do from time to time succeed, it is only, on the 
standard view, by a lucky accident that mitigates the normally 
disastrous effects of their limits. 
 
But on the evidence just canvassed this get things exactly backward. 
If developing economies and their institutions lack essences, and are 
as internally differentiated and context-dependent in their effects as 
the new stylized facts show them to be, omnibus reforms that ignore 
this heterogeneity will likely fail by treating very different economic 
contexts as though they were all alike, and always applying the same 
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institutional instruments to the same problems, even when the effect 
of those instruments varies because of their local interaction with 
other elements of the setting.  In contrast, reforms that somehow 
attend to local constraints by devising sequences of changes that 
extend the patches of  growth almost always occurring, without 
thereby opening the door to political predation, will be likely to 
succeed.  Thus, in the really existing, new stylized facts world, 
successful reform is normally  “heterodox” and heterodox  adjustment 
succeeds because of, not despite its partiality, selectivity and 
contextuality. On this processual view of development the 
fundamental conceptual problem is not specifying with more and 
more precision the foundations of growth, for the process creates its 
own “foundations,” but rather clarifying in what sense, and by what 
general means developing economies can influence this process to 
their advantage.   
 
4. Developing Economies as Toyoda Production Systems 
 
On the new stylized facts of development growth is not hard to start—
the lesson of the frequent growth accelerations and the geographic 
dispersion of growth centers in clusters. But neither on these facts is 
growth self perpetuating—the lesson of the decelerations that follow 
the growth spurts and the clusters’ frequent difficulties with 
“upgrading.”  In addition institutions on the new facts are de- and re-
composable, and that their effects depend on their context, including 
the context of other institutions—the lesson of the successes of 
heterodox reform and the failures of orthodoxy.  The problem of 
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development, given this much, is literally to institutionalize these 
results: to build institutions that can identify and relax the constraints 
on growth. What is needed, in still other words, are institutions that do 
not supplant their context, but rather use the growth-promoting 
strengths of the latter to overcome its growth-retarding weaknesses. 
 
To get from a general understanding of the relevant institutional 
innovations to their application to the problem of development we 
proceed in three steps. The first is to set out the class of especially 
context-sensitive and context-modifying organizations that improve 
outcomes by routinely identifying and overcoming limits posed by 
current operating procedures or routines. The growth-promoting 
institutions have to be a member of this class, if they exist at all, and 
the distinguishing features of their operation are most conspicuous at 
this highest level of generality. The next step is to illustrate the 
operation of this class in the domain of new public services, whose 
novelty consists precisely in their ability to provide customized or 
contextualized bundles of educational and other services to 
heterogeneous groups: just the kind of contextual adjustment of 
complex goals, in other words, required for the new institutions of 
development. The last step is to suggest, by a Chilean illustration, 
how similar principles are indeed already informing economic policy 
making in developing economies. 
 
As you will have surmised from innumerable hints along the way or a 
nodding acquaintance with the business pages of the newspaper, 
constraint-relaxing institutions have become broadly familiar (though 
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not necessarily in economics or even the sociology of organization) 
under the name of the Toyoda production system. The specificity of 
the name notwithstanding, they have diffused vastly beyond the 
Japanese firms, the automobile industry, and the production-line 
settings in which they arose.  Indeed it is almost impossible to survey 
recent writings about the new economy or reform of public 
administration—ranging from the re-organization public schooling to 
the provision of child protective services—without stumbling across 
extended reference to them. For present purposes three features of 
the Toyoda system are especially important.8
 
First, they identity constraints by stressing existing arrangements until 
(successive) weaknesses are revealed.  A famous example is just-in-
time production, in which all work-in-progress inventories are stripped 
away and parts are produced, at the limit, one at a time. Since 
defective work pieces can not be replaced with good ones from 
inventory, a breakdown at any station disrupts all downstream 
production. The only way to resume production is to correct the 
problem causing the disruption. Continuous improvement in the 
sense of the elimination of successive sources of disruption becomes 
in this deliberately fragile or lean environment a by-product of 
producing any output at all.   
 
In the design of new products disruption of current expectations and 
routines is produced by benchmarking: an exacting comparison of 
                                                 
8For extended discussion see Charles F. Sabel,  "Theory of a Real-Time Revolution," forthcoming in 
Collaborative Community, Charles Heckscher and Paul Adler, eds., Oxford University Press, 2005. 
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current products and processes “like” the currently employed ones, 
but with some attractive features current choices lack. The provisional 
design resulting from this first survey is refined by application of the 
same technique to its parts: The initial design is chunked into its 
major components—transmission, engine, and so on for automobiles. 
Each chunk is then benchmarked against alternatives by an 
appropriate specialist, and adjusted to take account of changes 
produced by the benchmarking of the others—a process often called 
simultaneous engineering. 
 
Once detected by this deliberate stressing, constraints in current 
arrangements are relaxed by problem-solving techniques that direct 
searches for solutions beyond the boundaries normally established 
by routine, yet limit them sufficiently to return useful results in the 
allowable time.  In production such problem-solving disciplines often 
go by the general name of root-cause analysis, to underscore their 
common assumption that the source of a disruption may not be 
palpably linked to the breakdown it provokes. A familiar example of 
such root-cause analysis are the five-why’s: 
 
Why is machine A broken?    No preventive maintenance 
was performed. 
Why was the maintenance crew derelict?  It is always repairing 
machine B.   
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Why is machine B always broken?   The part it machines 
always jams.  
Why does the jam recur?    The part warps from heat 
stress.  
Why does the part overheat?  A design flaw. (MacDuffie, 
1997, p 494)   
 
In design an analogous routine breaking but self-limiting search for 
solutions is entailed by benchmarking itself.  The evaluation of which 
products are enough “like” the target design to count in comparison 
directs attention away from habitual preferences and towards a broad 
consideration of just what that target should be. But the strengths and 
weakness of competing solutions are mutually illuminating, so that 
detailed consideration of the alternatives judged to be alike enough 
for comparison clarifies the currently feasible choices, producing a 
serviceable map of the available solution space.  
 
Finally, the search for constraint-relaxing solutions beyond the 
confines of routine continuously re-organizes the institutions which 
undertake them.  In traditional, hierarchical organizations, complex 
problems are solved by reducing them to simple tasks, and then 
aggregating the results of the simplified operations. In the Toyoda 
production system, in contrast, complex problems are in effect solved 
by finding someone who is already solving (part of) them.  
Benchmarking and simultaneous engineering do this explicitly by 
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identifying pieces of the target design puzzle originally produced for 
other, perhaps (once) distantly related purposes.  The organization of 
root-cause problem solving does this by effectively declaring each 
piece of the organization potentially relevant to the solution of the 
problems of any of the others. In an important sense the institution 
becomes an instrument for searching for solutions, and  changing its 
own organization to better do this as it: a search network, rather than 
a fixed hierarchy.9  
 
Although these features of the Toyoda production system bear on 
problem solving in general, the origin of these institutional innovations 
in the private sector may incorrectly suggest that they can only be 
applied  to that domain, and are thus irrelevant to public sector 
policies, including of course those fomenting growth. To better see 
the full generality of problem-solving by search, consider the 
application of this model of to the organization of the new public 
services that provide customized (combinations) of services to help 
individuals and families mitigate life risks. What makes these services 
new in contrast to familiar public services is that defining and 
redefining what they should be is anything but straightforward. In 
economic theory the purpose and value of a public service is self-
evident enough to give rise to a characteristic free rider problem: 
each citizen assumes all the others will want such public goods, and 
                                                 
9 In a fuller discussion I would show that the links among firms established by these collaborative 
disciplines do a better job of accounting for the widely noted vertical disintegration of production than two 
alternative explanations: informal co-operation among repeat players or the thoroughgoing modularization 
of products.  See Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Neither Modularity Nor Relational 
Contracting:  Inter-Firm Collaboration in the New Economy. A Response to Langlois and Lamoreaux, Raff, 
and Temin", with Jonathan Zeitlin, in Enterprise and Society 5, 3 
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that she can free ride on their willingness to pay for their provision. 
The result is that no one pays for traditional public goods unless all 
are obliged by joint decision to pay together. New public services, in 
contrast, are so idiosyncratic and mutable that they have to be in 
effect co-designed by client users if they are to be useful at all. 
Financing for new public services is not, of course, automatic. The 
defining difference is simply that the free-rider problem in new public 
goods is no more important than the problem of specifying the service 
in the first place.  The problem of effectively contextualizing general 
goals such as providing educational or health services is thus 
comparable—“like” in the benchmarking sense introduced above—
the problem of identifying and relaxing constraints on growth.     
 
School reform in the US is a well studied example of the routine 
invocation of the Toyoda production principles to address the new 
public service problem of determining what service to provide, and 
how to provide it.  The example is especially well suited to 
establishing the continuity in the use of the model across the public 
and private sectors because the traditional school in the US (and of 
course not only there) was consciously patterned on the mass-
production factory.  Men in teacher's colleges designed curricula, 
which were then translated into textbooks.  Women teachers in 
classrooms read the texts to students who moved from classroom 
seat to classroom seat, like pieces on an assembly line that 
advanced one position in a year. 
 
To respond to the needs of heterogeneous classes, with many 
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students arriving without the whole panoply of middle-class family 
support, required a thorough re-organization of the school: a re-
organization aimed at teaching pupils complex skills regardless of 
their starting point, rather than communicating information to them on 
the assumption that they started with the knowledge of how to use 
what was communicated. After more than two decades of desperate 
experimentation, reformers settled in the mid 1990s on a variant of 
root cause analysis that, fully in the spirit of the new stylized facts of 
development, allows effective reorganization to proceed by using 
partial solutions, and without presupposing any definitive model of the 
ultimate goal:  Use standard tests not only to reveal shortcomings in 
pupils’ learning strategies the staff’s teaching strategies, but also the  
defects in the organization of schools and school districts that are the 
root cause of these shortcomings.  
 
To see more concretely how this discipline might operate in school 
reform, consider the problem of teaching literacy. Learning to read, 
like mastering any complex task, requires each learner to assemble 
her own idiosyncratic bundles of general skills.  So in learning to read 
each kid must decode phoneme streams (phonics) with/while 
inferring the meaning of words in context (holistic semantics, or, if you 
read philosophy, semantic holism)--in her own way, which is to say 
with her own strengths and weaknesses in both skill areas. Thus 
some kids will use the meaning to guess sounds, while others will 
sound their way to the meaning. Many will have troubles doing either, 
but could benefit greatly if strengths in one area could be used to 
bootstrap them past difficulties in the other (by, say, learning to 
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decode a proper name that reveals a context, that then prompts more 
sounding out.) Standard tests can be used to diagnose individual 
learning problems, but also the systematic difficulties of some 
teachers, relative to others, in helping students overcome their 
particular blockages.  The aim of the institutional reform is to rebuild 
classes, schools and school systems so that these individual 
“defects” can be identified and remedied systematically.   
 
Thus the job of the teacher in this new public service is to organize 
the classroom to identify and remediate each pupil’s difficulties.  The 
job of the principal or school master is to organize the school so that 
teams of teachers within and across grade levels help each other 
achieve this goal (new search networks). And the job of the district of 
system head is to organize the system so that principals have the 
authority and autonomy to do this (more search networks).  At each 
step some variant of root-cause analysis is used to move from the 
diagnosis of an organizational problem revealed by poor test results 
to a specific “treatment” that address the cause of the difficulty. 
 
Reform by these means give rise almost naturally to new forms of 
school accountability.  Teachers and school officials are accountable 
to each other through the performance measures that make 
diagnosis of problems possible in the first place. They are also 
accountable to the public. Thus in many states in the US parents can 
compare the extent to which demographically comparable schools 
close the achievement gap between rich whites and other groups.  
This allows them to put pressure on school authorities, on politicians. 
 37
It also allows them to take action as families: school rankings have 
demonstrable effects on real estate prices. To the extent that 
reduction of the achievement gap results from more and more 
effective responses to more and more precise self-diagnosis of 
problems under pressure of such accountability systems, re-
organization of public schools in the US is an instance of the HACCP 
family of reform. 
 
There is, so far as I know, no strictly comparable institution routinely 
identifying and relaxing growth constraints in developing economies 
by such well honed and formalized routines.  To note only one 
conspicuously missing piece of such an institution: Data on economic 
performance in developing economies, as we saw, is still collected at 
such levels of aggregation, and in such form, as to make it next to 
useless as a source of information for diagnosing the difficulties of—
locating the constraints on—growth.  Whereas the data on student 
performance on standard tests can be used to pick out districts, 
schools, classrooms and student sub groups that are doing well or 
poorly, and so direct attention to what is working and what needs 
improvement, the league tables of competitiveness and other such 
rankings report national results and call for national action. This is not 
inadvertent. The league tables are conceived as an incentive system, 
with bad performers paying such a high price in forgone foreign 
investment and costly conditionality on borrowings that they are 
motivated to improve their showing by reform. (Standard tests of 
educational attainment were initially viewed the same way in the US, 
and in some quarters they still are.)  
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In the light of the new stylized facts of development it is easy to see 
that such incentive devices are at best incomplete, at worst seriously 
misleading. They suppose, among other things, that the leaders of a 
low ranking country almost already want to improve conditions (the 
incentives provide the last bit of necessary motivation), and know just 
what to do to get results when they have been prompted to want 
them. The same stylized facts suggest the need for diagnostic 
indicators; and Rodrik and other have begun to call for such growth 
diagnostics, and given experience in many other domains there is no 
reason in principle to think they will not be forthcoming.  Nonetheless, 
the call for such diagnostics by persons who would use them if they 
could is as good an indication as any that the new institutions of 
development are still a long ways from the routine context changing 
operation documented in other, arguably related settings. 
 
All this notwithstanding there is good circumstantial evidence from, 
for instance, Chile, that in the current cohort of developing economies 
the ensemble of growth-promoting institutions works jointly as an 
economy wide Toyoda production system—partially, selectively and 
unconventionally locating and reducing one constraint after another 
on exports—and that at least some of these institutions more and 
more explicitly apply the principles of such organizations. Thus the 
Chilean fruit industry—today country’s second largest exporter, after 
copper mining—traces back to the creation in the early 1960s of the 
Corporacion de Fomento (CORFO) and the National Institute of 
Agricultural Research (INIA) and their ensuing cooperation with the 
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University of Chile. Together these institutions (linked through the 
University of Chile with the University of California) developed the 
skills to identify exportable plant varieties and adapt them to local 
growing conditions. Beyond that they helped survey fruit orchards to 
assess their possibilities, analyze potential export demand and 
elaborate production goals, establish nurseries to propagate healthy 
plants, construct facilities for phytosanitary inspection of the harvest, 
and establish favorable credit lines and working capital for exports. 
 
But of the Chilean development institutions it is the Fundación Chile 
whose evolution approximates it more and closely and explicitly to the 
Toyoda model. The Fundación was created as a non-profit 
corporation by the  Chilean government in 1976 with a $50 million 
payment by ITT as part of an agreement indemnifying the 
conglomerate for expropriation of its national telephone 
subsidiary.  Under the agreement ITT was to manage the new facility 
for ten years. Its initial efforts were bumbling: the first director general, 
a semi-retired ITT food research scientist, wanted the new institution 
to provide social services such as school lunches and nutrition for 
infants.  His replacement,  the former head of ITT’s Spanish 
telecommunications laboratories, helped the Fundación master 
project-management skills, but wanted to develop 
telecommunications equipment for which there was no foreseeable 
market, and foodstuffs, for which the markets were incipient. Criticism 
of his suggestions, however, drew attention to prospects in renewable 
resources—principally forestry, aquiculture, and horticulture—which 
became the  foundations enduring focus. 
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Only in the aftermath of the economic shock of 1982 did the 
foundation develop the activities that have defined its strategy. A 
combination of sharp devaluation, low domestic interest rates and 
high uncertainty produced a situation favorable to domestic 
investment but too risky for domestic investors.  Seeing an 
opportunity in salmon farming the Fundación launched firms itself, 
hoping that success would lead to imitation and complementary 
activities. It acquired the necessary technology, free, from specialist 
public agencies in the US Pacific Northwest, and founded one firm to 
produce smelts, another to develop hatching and ranching technology 
for Chilean waters and a third for smoking fish. From these firms grew 
the Chilean salmon industry, which now produces $600 million in 
exports annually. 
 
In the next two decades the Fundación’s model of supporting 
development was refined in three crucial ways.10  First  the 
foundation shifted from creating start-ups itself to co-venturing with 
outside partners. Between 1985 and 1993 eighty-seven percent of 
the foundation’s start-ups where wholly owned by the foundation itself 
(and only one of the joint ventures involved a foreign partner).  But 
between 1994 to 2004 seventy-five percent of the start ups were joint 
ventures, and 6 of these were with foreign firms. Thus the foundation 
went from spinning out projects developed internally to networking 
with outsiders to create projects. Second, the technological 
                                                 
10 This account follows Fundación Chile,”Una oportunidad para Promover la Creación de Negocios 
Innovadores en Clusters Claves,” Santiago, nd. 
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complexity of projects increased, with biotechnology in particular 
become more and more important. Since projects in this area—new 
vaccines, development of pest-resistant fruit varieties—often required 
integration of scattered intellectual property and diverse technical 
tools for genetic manipulation many of the external partners had to 
construct networks of their own to serve the specific needs of the 
emergent companies. Thus the Fundación went from building 
networks to building and re-building networks of networks: it became, 
that is, a search network.  
 
Third, the Fundación’s own project-selection and review mechanism 
became more explicitly comparative or competitive:  Staff members, 
hired on the basis of demonstrated technical knowledge and 
familiarity with the markets and business practices in a particular 
sector, apply for internal grants to develop a case for launching a new 
venture in some general area. The projects born of the winning 
proposals become the basis for applications for a second, longer term 
grant to develop a business plan for a new venture, typically in 
partnership with outsiders.  The contests continue until the proto-
venture becomes a candidate for seed capital and enters the familiar 
sequence of venture capital financing.  Thus, as the Toyoda model 
would suggest, at every stage projects are benchmarked against 
internal and external alternatives, and the start ups that result are the 
institutionalized expression of the searches provoked by that 
benchmarking. The start ups fill gaps in, extend the reach of and 
otherwise relax constraints on the formation and growth of the 
clusters whose growth propels the Chilean economy.  They are thus 
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a m So far, at least, the transparency inherent in the broad and 
continual benchmarking of projects at every stage has also 
functioned as an effective governance mechanism, assuring that 
public funds are indeed directed towards public purposes, as best 
these can be defined at any moment. Here, then is a concrete 
intimation of the possibility of institutionalizing the idea of a 
developing economy as a Toyoda production system. 
 
To review the essentials of the argument thus far and underscore the 
novelty of Toyoda-inspired industrial policy it is useful to compe it with 
a related, though as we will see fundamentally distinct notion of 
encouraging development: Hirschman’s view of un-balanced growth. 
 
Hirschman’s model address two closely related, perennial 
problems—touched on repeatedly above—of market failure typical of 
(though not limited to) developing economies.11 The first is 
identification of potential markets, especially for exports, in the turbid 
and turbulent conditions of economic life distressingly close to 
subsistence levels. In a general equilibrium world there would be 
markets for all possible products (sold at all possible dates). Investors 
in developing economies could thus easily determine the costs of 
producing and the revenues from selling potential products, and 
choose the most profitable lines of business. In the real world of 
course it is very difficult for the first potential investor in some sector 
either to estimate the costs of adapting available technology to local 
                                                 
11 The problems of market identification and assurance of complementarities to be discussed next are of 
course in a different form familiar to high-tech venture capitalists in the advanced economies. 
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conditions or to gauge the size of the market accessible to domestic 
producers, except by going some way towards actually realizing the 
project.12 The second problem of market failure concerns the 
coordination of complimentary investments.  Potential producers of 
table grapes or stone fruits will hesitate to invest unless they can 
count on help with pest control, logistics, and compliance with phyto-
sanitary regulations that they cannot provide themselves. But firms 
that could provide these services will not unless there is some 
assurance of local demand. 
 
In the 1950s “big bang” theories of economic development argued 
that planned, simultaneous investment in all the key complements of 
a production process solved  both problems. Massive joint 
investment—the big bang—created effective demand for all the 
goods to be supplied while simultaneously resolving all questions of 
complementarity. The insurmountable problem, of course, was that 
this solution to the problem of development supposed that developing 
countries had precisely what they lacked: sufficiently abundant 
resources to plan and execute the massive intervention.  
 
Hirschman’s alterative was to address these problems by the 
mechanisms of unbalanced growth:  If a large (say state) investor 
committed funds to a grand, indubitably useful project (say a steel 
mill), then the resulting backward and forward linkages  (backward to 
the capital goods for making steel; forwards to fabrication of steel 
                                                 
12 Hausman and Rodrik call this the problem of self identification—potential investors have to discover, by 
reference to their particular circumstances, that they are indeed entrepreneurs 
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girders or rails) would create easily identified local demand that could 
be met without undue risk by domestic entrepreneurs.  A cascade of 
imbalances would thus create a sequence of opportunities motivating 
investors to fill in the missing pieces of the economic structure.  This 
kind of solution lost its appeal as it became clear that public investors 
could all too easily be captured by selfish interests, and that many 
projects that seemed indubitably good proved very dubious indeed.  
We will come to such governance issues in a moment.  But our 
concern here is with the similarities and, above all the differences 
between the unbalanced approach and the idea of developing 
economies as Toyoda production systems. 
 
A key similarity of course is incrementalism. In both cases one of 
many possible initial disruptions of an equilibrium suggests another, 
and the cumulative effect of moving from disequilibrium to 
disequilibrium is a comprehensive transformation that could not have 
been achieved of a piece.  A corollary is that there is, as Hirschman 
writes, no “primum mobile,” no “pre-requisite” to growth: no necessary 
and sufficient endowment, as has been argued here.   All the familiar 
preconditions of development are endogenous to the process of 
development. Hirschman recites the list current in his day: Skills 
needed for new industries can be learned; savings for investment can 
result from growth itself; entrepreneurship can emerge when 
purposive behavior, ingredient in the most diverse value systems, is 
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no longer diverted by short time horizons into trade and real estate 
speculation.13
 
The key difference between the views has to do with their respective 
assumptions about the organization of firms and the relations among 
them. In unbalanced growth  both are taken to be fixed. For 
Hirschman, as for most of the leading development economists of his 
day, the core of these relations can be captured in input/output tables, 
which show how each stage of production of each good in the 
economy is linked to the others. What is not known is the efficient 
sequence for building, in any particular national setting, the structure 
captured in the input/output table. Having rejected the primum mobile 
or endowments view, Hirschman’s insight is that the efficient 
sequence in any locale can be determined by accidental, or artfully 
induced perturbations.  
 
His example is fitting pieces to a jigsaw puzzle. Assuming that the 
time needed to fit each piece is inversely related to the number of 
adjacent pieces already placed, each fit of course attracts further, 
faster ones in the same neighborhood. Central neighborhoods can be 
identified by looking at the input/output table pictured as it were on 
the puzzle box. Taking advantage of knowledge of the overall picture 
and cues provided by local clustering of pieces the player completes 
the puzzle as quickly as possible.14  
 
                                                 
13 Hirschman, Strategy of Economic Development, pp. 1-7. 
14 Ibid, pp. 80-82.  But see also his later qualification of this reliance on input/output tables in Albert O. 
Hirschman, …. 
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In the Toyoda production system view, in contrast, both the internal 
organization of firms and the relations among them are continuously 
redefined by on-going searches for (partial) solutions to emergent 
problems. Firms, singly and together, form search networks whose 
nodes are routinely reconnected by the searches they enable. The 
jigsaw analogy to the world of  the Toyoda model would be game in 
which players have to fit pieces together without having any clear, 
box-top image as an initial guide—indeed without knowing whether 
the heap of pieces before them are drawn from several different 
puzzles rather than one. In this game the challenge is not getting to a 
known result in the shortest possible time, but determining what the 
outcome(s) will be. Of course making sense of multiple, conflicting 
but related outcomes, puzzling out what the puzzle is—benchmarking 
likes—is precisely what the Toyoda system is designed to do. Thus, 
whereas, unbalanced growth assumes disequilibrium in the execution 
of a known task, the Toyoda model assumes disequilibrium in design, 
and the all the way down: in the organization of industrial policy, but 
also in the government itself (new public services), in regulation 
(HACCPs) and the organization of the firm. 
 
4. Governance in Toyoda Production Model Institution 
 
Principal-agent models and why they can not work in a world where 
Toyoda Production Model institutions are indispensable. 
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